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RESPONSE 
How Medicalization of Civil Rights 
 Could Disappoint 
Allison K. Hoffman* 
Craig Konnoth’s article, Medicalization and the New Civil Rights,1 is a 
carefully crafted and thought-provoking description of the transformation of 
civil rights claims into medical rights frameworks. The piece compellingly 
threads together many intellectual traditions—from antidiscrimination law to 
disability law to health law—to illustrate the pervasiveness of the 
phenomenon that he describes.  
Descriptively, the article is rich. Konnoth shows how medical framing and 
evidence of physically identifiable and measurable harms have been providing 
new pathways to vindicate civil rights harms. This insight leads to his 
normative conclusion that medicalization can be a useful tool for civil rights 
advocacy. At places, I agreed. At others, I wondered whether the shifting 
ground Konnoth describes is as solid and productive as he asserts.  
From a short-term, utilitarian perspective, Konnoth argues that medical 
rights-seeking is delivering both antidiscrimination protections and positive 
rights and benefits at a moment in time when civil rights claims rooted in 
protected classes and status struggle.2 This part of his normative argument 
seemed plausible.  
Longer-term, however, I wonder whether medicalization of civil rights 
might tell a more ambivalent narrative in at least two ways. First, 
medicalization could produce a sociological narrowing that could eventually 
limit how we think about justice. Even though the subordination and trauma 
people experience can undoubtedly manifest in physical ways and we should 
recognize these harms, there may be downsides of overly focusing on these 
physical manifestations of discrimination. Second, and more speculatively, 
even the utilitarian benefits that medical framing is now producing might 
diminish as medicalization becomes a new situs for civil rights contests. 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. 
 1. Craig Konnoth, Medicalization and the New Civil Rights, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1165 (2020). 
 2. See generally Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011) 
(describing how the proliferation in identity groups has undermined the Supreme 
Court’s willingness to extend constitutional protection to new groups). 
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Without minimizing Konnoth’s thought-provoking insights, this 
response offers a few reasons why medicalization may not provide a clear civil 
rights cure in the long run and elaborates on the potential risks of 
overinvesting in medical rights-seeking. At the end, it considers whether the 
COVID-19 pandemic, which has produced a dramatic medical manifestation 
of social inequities and decades of civil rights deprivation, can illuminate the 
potential benefits or risks of medicalization.  
I. Sociological Narrowing  
One question the piece raises for me is whether it might be sociologically 
harmful in the longer term to translate civil rights from social into medical 
frameworks. I can imagine at least two possible ways in which increased 
medicalization may undermine civil rights progress, even if that progress 
seems stalled out in its current modes today. The first concern is whether 
medicalization may imply ex-post solutions to civil rights harms and in turn 
diminish the importance of structural solutions. My second, related concern 
is that medicalization could obscure parts of discrimination altogether, by 
focusing only on discrimination that manifests in medically meaningful 
harms. 
A. Too Little, Too Late 
First, medical rights-seeking may draw us further away from thinking 
about structural solutions that address root causes of racism, sexism, and 
other discrimination. Medicine tends to deal with fixing individuals, not 
social structures. Medicalization of discrimination reframes something that is 
a collective problem into this individualized patient-centric framework. Of 
course, maybe this is no different from where civil rights law has already gone. 
It relies increasingly on individual legal claims and harms, and structural 
interventions have become increasingly difficult in light of shifting 
affirmative action doctrine.3 Yet, there are moments when big civil rights 
victories, such as Obergefell, can still quickly translate into group-level benefits 
and social understandings.  
Medical rights may tend not to do so as easily. Konnoth discusses how 
Medicaid, the federal and state matching program that pays for medical 
assistance for poor people, has begun to allow states to experiment with 
providing housing services, such as security deposits for leases or lead testing, 
out of recognition that homelessness can adversely affect health.4 Although 
Medicaid has found creative ways to diagnose and treat housing insecurity, it 
can do so only at the individual (or family) level since it is a program designed 
to provide medical assistance to qualifying individuals one at a time. The 
 
 3. See id. at 748, 767-68, 775 n.198. 
 4. Konnoth, supra note 1, at 1196-97. 
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federal statute also prohibits spending on room and board.5 This means that 
Medicaid can partner with other government programs more specifically 
focused on housing, but on its own, this program of medical benefits can at 
best provide a patch on the larger problem of housing insecurity and 
discrimination.  
Even laws like the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the 
Rehabilitation Act that demand more structurally oriented reforms can still 
produce fairly narrow and small-scale remedies. The very example Konnoth 
cites as a positive signpost in rights recognition for mental disability—the 
language and reasoning of Mathews v. Eldridge as compared to the rights-
limiting language in City of Cleburne6—illustrates how medicalization can 
produce a framing of rights in individual ways.  
While the Cleburne Court struggled to see mental disability as a trait 
deserving group protection, caught up in “pluralism anxiety,”7 or concern 
about the proliferation of groups seeking legal recognition, the Mathews Court 
recognized mental disability but based on a case-by-case assessment. Konnoth 
is right that Mathews is preferable in terms of recognition of mental disability, 
but it also entails transforming a legal question about protection for a 
subordinated group into an individualized inquiry. Civil rights law has more 
generally been moving in this same direction, with a rejection of group-based 
claims and anti-subordination principles, but might medicalization sound a 
death knell to efforts to focus on group-level effects and structural 
interventions if it requires a case-by-case medical inquiry as in Mathews? 
Even public health usually falls short of true structural interventions. 
There is a well-known five-layered pyramid of public health interventions 
created by Thomas Frieden.8 At the top are efforts requiring individual-level 
effort (for example, counseling and education). At the bottom are 
interventions with increasing population impact. The public health ideal is to 
move to the base of the pyramid where socioeconomic factors lie. Even as 
scholars increasingly focus on these social determinants of health—factors 
like economic opportunity and infrastructure (transportation, sanitation, 
clean water) that have the greatest impact on health—public health efforts 
tend to stall one layer higher on the pyramid, which is about changing the 
 
 5. Id. at 1197.  
 6. Id. at 1237-38 (quoting language from City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 
473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1985), about a class-based approach to legal analysis and from 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-44 (1976), about an individual medical 
approach). 
 7. Yoshino, supra note 2, at 747-48 (describing aversion to the increase in the number 
and types of groups who might make civil rights claims and the resulting legal 
contraction of constitutional protections).  
 8. Thomas R. Frieden, A Framework for Public Health Action: The Health Impact Pyramid, 
100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 590, 591 (2010). 
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context to encourage healthy decisions. At this layer, we still look to 
individual behavior to improve outcomes.  
Konnoth’s discussion of wellness programs and food deserts illustrates 
how a medicalized perspective might in fact steer us to this level, where we 
look to the vulnerable to change their behavior, rather than asking why they 
are medically vulnerable in the first place. Konnoth suggests that the 
Affordable Care Act’s Wellness Programs, which allow employers to discount 
insurance premiums to some employees based on their engagement in healthy 
behaviors such as attending a gym, change the structural environment for 
“transforming social practices.”9 He offers that these policies might be seen as 
providing incentives to do better, just as building grocery stores in food 
deserts—neighborhoods without access to fresh foods—enables people to eat 
better. There is of course truth to these claims. Incentives and access can shape 
individual behavior.  
Yet, why some people use gyms more than others, or why some buy fresh 
fruits and veggies and others do not, is only in some small part about having 
access to gyms and fully-stocked groceries stores. It is more about who has 
the time and money to exercise and cook, as well as habits developed over 
generations of poverty. The Healthy Bodegas initiative in New York City 
discovered the challenge of overcoming all of these barriers in an effort to 
increase the availability and uptake of healthier foods in NYC corner stores.10 
Getting healthier food and drinks into corner stores was a significant 
challenge and yet only the first step in improving communities’ health. 
Focusing on individual health can imply behavioral solutions and place the 
onus on vulnerable people to do better, rather than casting our collective gaze 
on the roots of what drives health disparities. 
Furthermore, medicine is often reactive. Even what we call preventive 
care often does not actually prevent disease, but rather screens for and detects 
disease earlier to speed intervention once someone is already sick. Shifting 
civil rights claims into a framework that first requires a measurable health 
harm does little to prevent these harms from recurring one generation to the 
next.  
Take the fact that racism results in disproportionate rates of heart disease 
in black men. Might the medical civil rights remedy be to provide free Plavix, 
or aspirin, to black men? If sexism causes depression in women who hit a glass 
ceiling at work, or who struggle to balance caregiving for children or aging 
parents with work, the answer might be just as readily to dole out Prozac as 
to attempt to ameliorate the sexist structures that cause this depression. 
Targeted treatment is certainly not bad. Angela Harris and Aysha Pamukcu 
 
 9. Konnoth, supra note 1, at 1225-26. 
 10. Sarah Kliff, Byrd Pinkerton, Jillian Weinberger & Amy Drozdowska, Healthy Options—
Or Soda Taxes? How Two Cities Are Tackling Obesity, VOX: THE IMPACT (Nov. 16, 2018, 
10:20 AM EST), https://perma.cc/Q7JM-GXMM (challenges discussed around 
minute twelve).  
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describe in The Civil Rights of Health how public health data might enable 
targeted treatment of this sort that would otherwise be illegal “reverse 
discrimination.”11 This could be progress, for sure, but downstream. 
Today’s civil rights law may be no more effective at addressing 
discrimination in structural and transformative ways. Yet medicalization may 
by definition be forever incapable of doing so because of its granular and 
belated way of understanding harms and may affirm some of the deepest 
failings in civil rights law’s doctrinal development.  
B. Partially Obscuring Discrimination  
My second, and greater, sociologically related concern is whether the 
translation of civil rights harms into medical terms actively obscures part of 
the social problem, like a scrim curtain over sexism, racism, or homophobia. 
Recognizing physical manifestations of discrimination, as Harris and 
Pamukcu call us to do, is obviously important.12 However, discrimination is 
problematic for reasons that reach well beyond the measurable, physical ways 
it manifests, and medicalization may subtly encourage us not to see racism or 
sexism as harmful when they fail to manifest in physical ways. Seeing that 
stress, trauma, and abuse from subordination have physical manifestations 
that civil rights law can ameliorate through health interventions is valuable, 
yet medical rights-seeking risks reducing discrimination to its physical 
manifestations.   
Here, a couple of examples of ways that medicalization within the law can 
narrow the way we think of a social issue may help. These examples draw 
from areas of law outside of Konnoth’s article to offer analogies that may serve 
to illustrate what can happen when the law defines or recognizes a social 
problem or harm too narrowly.   
Take tort law and the example of what are sometimes called “pure” 
emotional harms because they occur in the absence of physical injury. 
Emotional damages for these harms were long excluded from civil liability.13 
In fact, until relatively recently, if there were no physical impact and bodily 
harm, courts were reticent to recognize damages except in a limited set of 
egregious circumstances, such as the mishandling of a corpse. Even in the 
modern era, recovery for emotional harms is guided by a circumscribed set of 
rules that are intended to serve as a proxy for “real” damage. 
 
 11. Angela P. Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, The Civil Rights of Health: A New Approach to 
Challenging Structural Inequality, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
 12. See id. at 17. 
 13. See Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A 
History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 816 (1990). 
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Even when recognized, the law often requires serious emotional harm or 
a physical manifestation14—a medicalization requirement, like a doctor’s note 
to validate the harm. On the frontier of such efforts, legal scholars have 
considered whether neurological scans might be useful to prove emotional 
distress.15 These requirements can imply that someone’s harm is not real until 
attested to by a doctor and measurable in medically recognized ways. 
The limiting nature of such requirements can divorce remedy from 
common sense. On my Torts exam this year, I asked students to consider a 
mother who used Johnson & Johnson’s baby powder that might have been 
laced with asbestos on her baby boy. Years later as a young adult, he developed 
mesothelioma—the signature diseases of asbestos exposure. The students 
quickly saw that the mother’s harms didn’t fit squarely into the cases where 
the law most readily awards emotional damages.16 A progressive court might 
deem such harm serious enough for recognition nonetheless, but others may 
not. Tort law looks for certainty and objectivity but in the process diminishes 
our understanding of emotional harm and undersells the ability of judges or 
jurors to gauge when it reasonably occurs, even if not medically measurable. 
As Konnoth notes, medicalization makes something seem more objective 
and scientific, but that is not necessarily a good thing. Rather, it is a form of 
what David Frankford deems “scientism,” where certain disciplines (law and 
economics, for example) take on a veneer of exactitude or expertise that is 
overdetermined.17 Scientism is especially concerning in the medicalization of 
civil rights since the “objectivity” of medical opinion has often been on the 
wrong side of civil rights, from justifying the sterilization of black women to 
determining who is white for immigration purposes.18 And medical science 
can sit on both sides of the law in a problematic way, as illustrated by the fact 
that two Supreme Court cases decided just seven years apart came to opposite 
conclusions on the legal necessity of a health exception to a so-called partial 
birth abortion law, despite the fact that the medical evidence had not changed 
 
 14. See id. at 820; Betsy J. Grey, The Future of Emotional Harm, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2605, 
2611 (2015). 
 15. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a Neuroscience Model of Tort Law: How 
Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 
235, 246 (2012). 
 16. These include having suffered physical impact or meeting the elements of a bystander 
cause of action for observing negligent harm to a loved one, which include 
requirements like proximity, visibility (sensory and contemporaneous observance of 
an accident), and close familial relationship. Restatement (Third) of Torts §§ 47-48 
(2012). 
 17. See David M. Frankford, Scientism and Economism in the Regulation of Health Care, 19 J. 
HEALTH POL.  POL’Y & L. 773, 778 (1994). 
 18. See IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 1-2 (2006 
ed.); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE 
MEANING OF LIBERTY 56-57 (2016 ed.). 
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in that timeframe.19 The legitimacy that medicine has in court can be harmful 
to civil rights just as easily as it can advance them. And the very groups that 
civil rights law aims to protect are those who tend to trust the medical 
establishment the least, for good reason.20 
A second and totally different example of where medicalization under the 
law has narrowed our vantage draws from my writing on long-term care.21 
Medicalization in social welfare program design led to an undervaluation of 
non-medical caregiving that persists to this day. 
At the start of the 1900s, public welfare for long-term care was provided 
locally in almshouses, but most people remained reliant on family care.22 Over 
the course of the twentieth century, however, public funding for long-term 
care grew, with federal funding beginning in earnest after the Great 
Depression. The Social Security Act of 1935 included the Old-Age Assistance 
program (for poor elderly individuals), Aid to the Blind, and Aid to Dependent 
Children, which were all programs of cash assistance that paid for care in 
nursing homes.23 Simultaneously, home-based care continued with the 
support of various local, state, and federal efforts including the Works 
Progress Administration’s “Housekeeping Services.”24 These programs 
funded everything from nursing care to personal care and even housework 
and childcare in some cases for ill or disabled mothers.25  
The mid-century rise of private medical insurance, however, began to 
undermine these home-based care programs. Private health insurance 
required services to be performed by licensed providers, which relocated 
medical aspects of caregiving to hospitals and institutions. Care-intensive 
aspects were excluded and left to underfunded state welfare programs.26 This 
medicalized model was then replicated in public financing, including in the 
 
 19. Compare Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (holding that a Nebraska law 
prohibiting “partial-birth abortion,” an intact dilation and extraction procedure, was 
illegal because it did not include an exception for the health of the pregnant woman), 
with Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161-64 (2007) (following Stenberg by seven 
years and upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 despite no exception 
for the health of the pregnant woman).  
 20. Katrina Armstrong, Karima L. Ravenell, Suzanne McMurphy & Mary Putt, 
Racial/Ethnic Differences in Physician Distrust in the United States, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
1283, 1287 (2007).  
 21. See generally Allison K. Hoffman, Reimagining the Risk of Long-Term Care, 16 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS. 147 (2016) (describing the way that social policy has 
conceived of long-term care risk and arguing that this conception is overly narrow). 
 22. EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH WORKERS IN 
THE SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE 20 (2012). 
 23. Sidney D. Watson, From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and Community Care: Lessons from 
Medicaid’s History, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 941-47 (2010). 
 24. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 22, at 22. 
 25. Id. at 30.  
 26. Id. at 65. 
How Medicalization of Civil Rights Could Disappoint 
72 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 165 (2020) 
172 
1965 creation of the two largest public health insurance programs: Medicare 
for the elderly and Medicaid for poor families and blind and disabled people.27  
These programs perpetuate an exclusion and devaluation of non-medical 
caregiving to this day. Medicare funds long-term care at best “tangentially,” 
such as post-acute care after hospitalization, but it does not pay for support 
with ongoing activities of daily living in home settings.28 Long-term nursing 
care was excluded from Medicare altogether because it was deemed “more 
custodial than medical.”29  
Medicaid, in contrast, finances over half of all paid long-term care,30 and 
still bears the mark of medicalization. Medicaid began with an “institutional 
bias” favoring the provision of long-term care in licensed nursing homes or 
other licensed institutions.31 This institutional care was designated as a 
mandatory benefit—one that states must cover to receive federal Medicaid 
matching funds, which pay for over half of the total program costs.32 In 
contrast, personal care in home settings (for example, bathing, dressing, 
eating, light housework, or grocery shopping) was made an optional benefit 
that states may, but do not have to, cover.33 Even as Medicaid’s institutional 
bias has receded in favor of home-based care,34 states’ programs do not cover 
the caregiving services people need at home. After over a half century of 
Medicaid operating in a manner in which medical care is mandatory and 
personal or “custodial” care is optional, the notion that social insurance should 
support the medical but not the social aspects of care endures in a deep way. 
Konnoth discusses some institutional objections to medical rights-
seeking, such as whether shifting authority from legal to medical institutions 
may be harmful. The greater institutional harms may be less obvious, 
sociological effects. The many life experiences that we all have—
discriminatory or not—undoubtedly take root in our physical beings, but 
focusing on the physical manifestations of harms might narrow the way we 
 
 27. See Watson, supra note 23, at 953-54. 
 28. Judith Feder, Harriet L. Komisar & Marlene Niefeld, Long-Term Care in the United 
States: An Overview, 19 HEALTH AFF. 40, 44 (2000). 
 29. Watson, supra note 23, at 956. 
 30. ERICA L. REAVES & MARYBETH MUSUMECI, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICAID 
AND LONG-TERM SERVICES AND SUPPORTS: A PRIMER 3 (Dec. 2015). 
 31. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 61 (2004). 
 32. REAVES & MUSUMECI, supra note 30, at 5; Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) 
for Medicaid and Multiplier, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/R8DN-JPNW 
(archived June 6, 2020) (noting that “[b]y law, the FMAP cannot be less than 50%”).   
 33. REAVES & MUSUMECI, supra note 30, at 5; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(22), 1396d(a)(24) 
(2018). 
 34. Moving care into home settings has been called rebalancing in large part in response 
to the Olmstead decision that demanded care in the least restrictive settings possible. 
See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999) (holding that people with mental 
disabilities have the right to live in community-based settings, instead of institutions, 
if appropriate, desired, and feasible). 
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conceive of the social problem and solutions. Emotional harms that do not 
manifest in physical measurable ways may be as, or more, damaging than 
those that do. Non-medical caregiving can contribute more to health and 
security than medical caregiving. Non-medical manifestations of racism—
such as diminished economic inequality and over-criminalization—should 
concern us as much, or more, than physical manifestations. If the law narrows 
in on remedying the physical, we may risk losing sight of the full picture and 
problem.  
In his Introduction, Konnoth writes: “In an ideal world, our views on 
poverty, homelessness, and unemployment would evolve.”35 Might 
medicalization move us even further from this ideal world by diverting us 
from this evolution? 
II. The Malleability of Medicalization’s Utilitarian Benefits  
The second way in which I question Konnoth’s normative conclusions 
concerns his assertion—albeit an admittedly tentative one—that 
medicalization may make people more open to civil rights claims because it 
shifts blame away from individuals and makes them more deserving of 
support.36 Konnoth recognizes that “[m]edical claims are malleable [and] 
contingent . . . social phenomena.”37 In light of such malleability, however, it 
may be possible that the short-term benefits that Konnoth identifies as 
produced by medicalization could erode if medical rights become the new 
situs of civil rights.  
Konnoth plants his normative conclusion in the idea that we have more 
empathy for medical suffering than suffering due to, for example, poverty, 
even as he recognizes the paucity of evidence in support of this proposition.38 
It is quite possible that we have more empathy for someone else’s suffering 
when we think of it as being a medical harm outside of her agency. Yet, 
medical suffering gets sorted both into the category of suffering where we feel 
empathy and also the category where we do not. These categories vary by 
country and community and can undoubtedly shift over time. As Konnoth 
recognizes, some problems like alcoholism, lung cancer caused by smoking, 
and HIV/AIDS in the early days of the respective diseases failed to garner 
much empathy.39 Elsewhere like France, however, smoking has a different 
valance than it does in the United States and, in turn, lung cancer may be less 
blameworthy. We translate social fixations or idiosyncrasies into medical 
terms. 
 
 35. Konnoth, supra note 1, at 1174. 
 36. See id. at 1234-35. 
 37. Id. at 1174. 
 38. Id. at 1222. 
 39. See id. 
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For instance, Konnoth suggests that the response to opioid addiction was 
different from the response to crack addiction because the former was framed 
as a medical problem whereas the latter was seen as mere addiction, a lack of 
will.40 This distinction seems too stark to me.  
It is not clear that we cast less blame on opioid addicts. People in towns 
with high opioid addiction have complained of reversing overdoses and 
saving lives through the use of naloxone, and have gone so far as to suggest it 
might be better to let addicts die.41 Surveys show U.S. adults are just as likely 
to blame people addicted to prescription painkillers as we are to blame the 
doctors who overprescribed them.42 
To the extent we might blame addicts less in the era of opioids, which is 
not evident, it is not clearly because of medicalization of the opioid crisis. We 
may blame doctors more this time around because they did, in fact, contribute 
significantly to opioid addiction in a way they did not to crack addiction. But 
the larger difference between the two crises is that crack was 
disproportionately seen as a “black person” addiction and opioids are a “white 
person” addiction.43 Race has as much to do with how the crisis is perceived 
and whether we cast blame on people with addictions or on society at large, 
as the fact that we call opioid addiction an epidemic. 
Even more so, medicalization does not appear to lend much empathy to 
one of our greatest ongoing civil rights challenges: protections for 
undocumented immigrants. Quite the opposite: Evidence of medical need 
could limit someone’s ability to come to the United States legally under public 
charge rules, which have tightened under the Trump Administration and also 
predated it.44 And while the rise of the coronavirus in the United States could 
in theory have led to a loosening of immigration restrictions and a reticence 
to put people into crowded detention centers where their lives are at grave 
 
 40. Id. at 1234-35. 
 41. Ben Haller, One Way to End the Opioid Epidemic. Let Them Die, NEWSWEEK (July 21, 
2017, 7:10 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/DLQ4-Z3BJ.  
 42. BIANCA DIJULIO, BRYAN WU & MOLLYANN BRODIE, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE 
WASHINGTON POST/KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION SURVEY OF LONG-TERM 
PRESCRIPTION PAINKILLER USERS AND THEIR HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS 13 tbl.5 (Dec. 
2016).  
 43. See Andrew Cohen, How White Users Made Heroin a Public-Health Problem, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 12, 2015), https://perma.cc/V626-N68U; Opioid Overdoes Deaths by 
Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2018), https://perma.cc/V4RS-D676 (showing 
the racial breakdown of opioid overdose deaths). 
 44. See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,295 (Aug. 14, 
2019) (expanding the interpretation of what constitutes a public charge to include, for 
example, receipt of benefits through Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, 
food stamps, or Medicaid). 
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risk, it has not provoked such a response.45 Empathy is contingent, even when 
it comes to medical harms that are no fault of our own.  
Conclusion  
As I write this response, we live under a cloud of coronavirus, which is 
unveiling all of our society’s failings through the lens of illness. We see the 
fractures of our health insurance system, the instability of our unemployment 
system, the precariousness caused by our immigration and criminal justice 
system, and the disparate impact of pandemic by age, income, and race.46 Yet, 
these problems are larger and more complex than their manifestation in this 
particular medical moment—and the fixes that the medicalization of these 
problems suggests have so far been short-term and incomplete. Checks of 
$1,200, indemnification of the costs of COVID-19 testing, and temporary 
reduction of jail populations will only go so far. 
It is possible that coronavirus will catalyze greater awareness of and 
empathy for social inequities, as Konnoth’s arguments might imply. Some 
public health experts have indeed gestured in this direction.47 If this 
awareness motivates action, it could mean a monumental unsettling of 
decades of growing inequality. Yet, true civil rights progress demands 
reckoning with the deep roots and structural breath of social inequality that, 
of course, include and also reach well beyond how inequality rears its ugly 
head in a moment of acute medical crisis. 
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